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Abstract
We present the first non-interactive zero-knowledge argument system for QMA with multi-
theorem security. Our protocol setup constitutes an additional improvement and is constructed in the
malicious designated-verifier (MDV-NIZK) model (Quach, Rothblum, and Wichs, EUROCRYPT
2019), where the setup consists of a trusted part that includes only a common uniformly random
string and an untrusted part of classical public and secret verification keys, which even if sampled
maliciously by the verifier, the zero knowledge property still holds. The security of our protocol is
established under the Learning with Errors Assumption.
Our main technical contribution is showing a general transformation that compiles any sigma
protocol into a reusable MDV-NIZK protocol, using NIZK for NP. Our technique is classical but
works for quantum protocols and allows the construction of a reusable MDV-NIZK for QMA.
∗Tel Aviv University, omrishmueli@mail.tau.ac.il. Supported by ISF grants 18/484 and 19/2137, by Len Blavatnik
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1 Introduction
Zero-knowledge protocols allow to prove statements without revealing anything but the mere fact that
they are true. Since their introduction by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR89] they have had a
profound impact on modern cryptography and theoretical computer science at large. While standard
zero-knowledge protocols are interactive, Blum, Feldman, and Micali [BFM19] introduced the concept
of a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) protocol, which consists of a single message sent by the
prover to the verifier. NIZK protocols cannot exist in the plain model (i.e. a language with such a NIZK
protocol can be decided by an efficient algorithm) but can be realized with a pre-computed setup. The
point of the setup is that it can be computed instance-independently and usually, the setup is executed by
a trusted third party that generates and publishes a string of bits and sometimes trapdoors are handed to
the prover or verifier (or both).
Although existing zero-knowledge protocols for NP cover an array of diverse tasks and in particular,
under standard computational assumptions it is knownhow to construct NIZKprotocols forNP [CCH+19,
PS19, BKM20], far less is knownabout the classQMA, the quantumgeneralization ofNP. This knowledge
gap between NP and QMA, which is present in both interactive and non-interactive zero-knowledge
protocols, stems from the fact that many of the techniques that work for NP and more precisely, classical
information-processing, usually fail when are needed for the processing of quantum information.
The first expression of the gap between classical and quantum NIZK protocols is that of setup
requirements, that is, how much trust and resources the setup needs. For example, the standard setup in
NIZK is called the common reference string (CRS) model, where the trusted party samples a classical
string from some specified distribution and publishes it (no trapdoors are handed to either prover or
verifier in this model). If the reference string is simply uniformly random then the setup is in the
common random string model, which is considered to require minimal trust in the NIZK setting, as
the trusted party holds no trapdoors whatsoever. NIZK arguments for NP are known to exist in the
common random string model under LWE [CCH+19, PS19]. In current QMA constructions the setup is
comprised at least of a common reference string sampled by the trusted party, and an additional public
and secret verification keys (pvk, svk) where pvk is published along with the CRS and svk is kept by the
verifier, such that either:
• pvk is a quantum state that needs to stay coherent while waiting for the proof by the prover, or
• The pair (pvk, svk) can be sampled only by the trusted party and not the verifier.
Aside from the above, perhaps the most basic missing part between NIZK protocols for NP and
QMA is the existence (or inexistence) of multi-theorem security. Multi-theorem security considers the
reusability of the setup, that is, once the setup is computed, any prover can send a proof by a single
message repeatedly for many different statements and there is no need to re-compute the setup for every
new proof sent and in relation to the above QMA setups: once the CRS and public verification key are
published, they are reusable. However, although multi-theorem security provides the main efficiency
advantage to a NIZK protocol over an interactive protocol, we currently don’t have non-interactive
zero-knowledge protocols for QMA with reusable setups.
Given the gap of knowledge in NIZK techniques between NP and QMA, improving the power of
NIZKs for QMA seem as a natural cryptographic goal which we explore in this work.
1.1 Results
Under the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption [Reg09] we resolve the above open question. Specifi-
cally, we construct aNIZK argument forQMAwithmulti-theorem security and reduce setup requirements
by proving security in the following model:
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1. The trusted party samples only a common random string crs.
2. Given crs, any verifier can sample a pair of classical public and secret verification keys (pvk, svk),
in particular it is possible that the published pvk is maliciously-generated.
Given crs and pvk, any prover can repeatedly give a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof by a single
quantummessage |π〉. The above setup model is introduced by Quach, Rothblum, andWichs in [QRW19]
as the malicious designated-verifier model (MDV-NIZK), and has the same minimal trust requirements
as the common random string model (but is privately verifiable).
Theorem 1.1 (informal). Assuming that LWE is hard for polynomial-time quantum algorithms, there ex-
ists a reusable, non-interactive computational zero-knowledge argument system for QMA in the malicious
designated-verifier model.
Main Technical Contribution: General Sigma Protocol MDV-NIZK Compilation. Technically, we
deviate completely from previous NIZK constructions for QMA and our main contribution is showing
how given a NIZK for NP it is possible to compile any general sigma protocol into a reusable MDV-
NIZK protocol. Our technique is simple and purely classical but works also for quantum zero-knowledge
protocols and in particular can be used for showing a reusable MDV-NIZK for QMA. Further details are
given in the technical overview below.
1.2 Technical Overview
We next describe our construction of a multi-theorem-secure MDV-NIZK protocol for QMA. For a
discussion about the possibility of constructing a NIZK protocol for QMA in the CRS model see
subsection 1.3.1, and for an overview of NIZK models and previous work on NIZK for QMA see
subsection 1.3.2.
We deviate from previous approaches of NIZK for QMA and take a different (and very natural)
approach: Find a "classical anchor" in quantum zero-knowledge protocols and then solve the problem
by having a NIZK for NP. As such we currently restrict our attention to an even simpler, purely-classical
question: Given any sigmaprotocol (Σ.P,Σ.V), generically compile it into amulti-theorem-secureMDV-
NIZKwhile assuming minimal properties of the protocol1. Wewill start with considering classical sigma
protocols and later see what changes should take place in order for the technique to work for quantum
protocols.
From a Sigma Protocol to a Single-Theorem-Secure MDV-NIZK. A sigma protocol is a 3-message
public-coin proof system (with some mild zero knowledge properties), where the 3 messages are denoted
by α, β and γ (i.e. β is a random string and is called "the challenge string"). Our first step is to construct
a MDV-NIZK protocol with only single-theorem security out of a sigma protocol and is very simple.
In a sigma protocol, since the verifier’s message β is a random string it is independent of any other
information, additionally, our second need from it is that it stays hidden (until after the prover sends
its first message α). The verifier can compute its public verification key, which is computed instance-
independently, as a function of β: The public verification key pvk is an FHE-encrypted random challenge
β and the secret verification key svk is the FHE decryption key and the challenge string,
pvk = FHE.Encfhek(β), svk = (β, fhek) .
Given the public verification key pvk, the 1-message proof procedure for x ∈ L goes as follows:
• P computes the first sigma protocol message α← Σ.P(x,w), where w ∈ RL(x).
1In particular, we do not assume that the message α is classical.
2
• P computes γ the last protocol message under the encryption, that is, P performs the homomorphic
evaluation cˆtP ← FHE.Eval(Σ.P3,FHE.Encfhek(β)).
• As the proof, P sends α out in the open and γ under the encryption, that is, the proof is π = (α, cˆtP).
In order for the proof to stay zero-knowledge, the homomorphic evaluation needs to be circuit-private.
The verification algorithm is straightforward: Given svk, an instance x and a proof π = (α, cˆtP), the
verifier decrypts cˆtP to get γ, and accepts iff the sigma protocol verifier accepts Σ.V(x, α, β, γ) = 1.
Is the Above Protocol Multi-Theorem-Secure? While it is intuitively clear that the described con-
struction is secure for a single use of the setup (that is, the above should, with some modifications,
yield a single-theorem-secure MDV-NIZK) it is provably not multi-theorem-secure by a standard attack.
Sigma protocols are usually parallel repetitions of 3-message zero-knowledge protocols, for example,
consider the sigma protocol which is the parallel repetition of the zero-knowledge protocol for Graph
Hamiltonicity [Blu86], which is as follows: Given a Hamiltonian cycle C in a graph G = (V,E), the
prover samples a random permutation ϕ : V → V of the vertices and commits to the permuted graph
ϕ(G)2. The verifier then sends a random bit b, and the prover answers accordingly:
• If b = 0 it is considered as a validity check, and the prover opens all commitments and sends ϕ.
The verifier accepts if indeed the committed graph is ϕ(G).
• If b = 1 it is considered as the cycle check, and the prover opens commitments only for the
subgraph ϕ(C). The verifier accepts if the opening shows a Hamiltonian cycle.
If the sigma protocol used in the above MDV-NIZK construction is the parallel repetition of the
zero-knowledge protocol for Hamiltonicity3, then there is a polynomial-time malicious prover P∗ that
given multiple access to the verifier’s verdict function V(svk, ·) using the same public/secret verification
key pair, can decode the encrypted challenge string β (which is polynomially-many random bits, each bit
is for the i-th parallel repetition of the zero-knowledge protocol) and consequently break the soundness.
P∗ takes a Hamiltonian graph G and a Hamiltonian cycle C in it, and will decode the entire
β = (b1, b2, · · · , bk) bit-by-bit: To decode bi, P
∗ will honestly execute the zero-knowledge protocol
prover’s algorithm for all indices but index i (that is, for all j 6= i, it will honestly compute Com(ϕj(G))
and under the encryption, the opening of either the entire graph and the permutation of just the cycle
ϕj(C)), for which it is going to operate as follows. P
∗ will guess that bi = 0 and send a commitment
to a permutation of the graph out in the open and under the encryption act as if bi = 0 regardless of the
actual value of bi. By the verifier’s acceptance or rejection it will know whether the bit was 0 or 1. After
decoding β the prover can now use this information to "prove" that any graph G is Hamiltonian.
From Single-Theorem to Multi-Theorem Security. In the above attack the prover heavily relied on a
specific operation: It uses a yes-instance (in the above case, a Hamiltonian graph G), in order to decode
the random challenge β and then goes on to use the knowledge of β to give a false proof for a no-instance
(again, in the above, a non Hamiltonian graph G∗).
Crucially, P∗ does not know how to decode β when the graph is not Hamiltonian. More specifically,
in the above we decode β bit-by-bit rather than all at once, and this ability comes from the fact that G is
Hamiltonian and the zero-knowledge protocol is complete, thus P∗ can be sure that if it honestly executes
the zero-knowledge protocol for all indices but i, the only index that can make the proof get rejected
is i. In this isolation, checking whether the challenge bit bi is 0 or 1 becomes trivial. However, if the
graph is not Hamiltonian then the prover cannot know which index made the proof get rejected because
all k indices are prone to rejection. Formally, by the soundness of the sigma protocol, we know that the
2That is, the prover commits to all of the cells in the adjacency matrix that represents the graph ϕ(G).
3We take the Hamiltonicity protocol only as a concrete easy example and in fact any other sigma protocol can take the role
of this protocol in our context of attacking the soundness.
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answer from the verdict function of the verifier in this case will always be a rejection for any polynomial
(or even sub-exponential) number of queries, with overwhelming probability. This means in particular
that the prover cannot decode anything through the oracle access to the verdict function.
Our fix to the first protocol is based on the above observation: If we could make the random challenge
β change with the instance at hand it seems that the decoding attack is neutralized, because even if the
prover decodes βG the challenge for a Hamiltonian graph G, it doesn’t have information about βG∗ the
challenge of some non Hamiltonian G∗. Since the instance x is in particular a classical string we
can make the challenge change with the instance: The public verification key will not be an encrypted
challenge β but instead will be a secret key prfk of a pseudorandom function PRF. The prover will
compute α out in the open as before but the homomorphic evaluation changes: under the encryption,
P will compute the challenge string as the PRF’s output on the instance βx = PRF.Fprfk(x), and then
compute γ for the challenge βx.
Extraction by Non-interactive Zero Knowledge for NP. Up to this point we only came close to
constructing a provably-secure MDV-NIZK. Indeed, we didn’t even use any NIZK tools yet for NP, and
in order to prove the security of our construction we need knowledge extraction from both the prover and
verifier.
To prove soundness, our thought process is roughly the following: We know that the prover computes
γ obliviously under the FHE,more precisely, it homomorphically evaluates the circuit Cx,r that computes
βx = PRF.Fprfk(x) and then given βx computes γ. The part of the circuit Cx,r that computes γ from βx
is the "non-trivial" part of the circuit and is determined by a secret string r (which is the information that
the honest sigma protocol prover uses in order to compute γ, this information is the randomness of the
prover and possibly the witness). If we could extract r from a prover (e.g. by the prover giving a proof
of knowledge on the non-trivial part of the circuit Cx,r) that successfully cheats in the NIZK protocol
then we could get a successfully cheating prover for the sigma protocol and thus prove security. To see
this, note that by the hiding of the FHE and by the pseudorandomness of the PRF, even if as the public
verification key we send an encryption of 0 instead of an encryption of the PRF secret key, the string
r still needs to yield a circuit Cx,r that does well in generating a satisfying γ for a now-truly-random
challenge β.
On the zero knowledge side we also need extraction, and we start with recalling a basic property
of a sigma protocol: if we know the challenge string β before sending the first message α then we can
simulate a view that is indistinguishable from the real interaction with the honest prover. This means that
the information we want to extract from the malicious verifier is the secret PRF key prfk that in particular
holds the information for obtaining βx.
We solve both extraction tasks by a combination of a two-sided NPNIZK and a public-key encryption
schemewith pseudorandompublic keys. Given the existence of a PKE scheme (PKE.Gen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec)
with pseudorandom public keys of length ℓ we take the common random string of our protocol to be (1)
the common random string of an NP NIZK (NIZK.Setup,NIZK.P,NIZK.V) protocol which we denote
with crs, concatenated with (2) a random string of length ℓ which we denote with ek (for extraction key).
We will let each of the parties encrypt, using PKE.Encek(·), the secrets that we want to extract and
then use the NIZK to prove consistency between the content of the PKE encryption and the protocol
computations. More precisely, as part of its 1-message proof, the prover will give a proof πP that the
string r encrypted using the PKE yields the (canonical) circuit Cx,r that it used for the (circuit-private)
homomorphic evaluation that generated γ, and the verifier, as part of its public verification key, will
give a proof πV that the PRF key prfk that is encrypted using the PKE is the same key encrypted with
the FHE. Note that the information that the parties encrypt using a random string instead of a real PKE
key stays secure due to the fact that a real key is indistinguishable from a random string, and thus an
adversary that manages to break the PKE when it uses a random string as the public key can break the
pseudorandomness property of the public keys.
When wanting to extract information (either in the soundness reduction or in the zero-knowledge
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simulation), we will sample ek using the PKE key-generation algorithm (ek, sk)← PKE.Gen, and since
the public keys are pseudorandom the change in key distribution won’t be felt by either of the parties. At
that point the parties encrypt their secrets and prove they do so using the NIZK, and the extractor can
just use the PKE decryption PKE.Decsk(·) to obtain the secrets.
Compiling Quantum Protocols. Our technique so far is entirely classical and compiles classical sigma
protocols. We now ask whether it works to compile quantum sigma protocols. This can be answered in
turn by answering the following question: what properties of the sigma protocol exactly did we use in
order for the MDV-NIZK protocol to work?
It can be verified that even if we don’t assume nothing on the sigma protocol that we compile, every
action in the MDV-NIZK protocol except the homomorphic evaluation of the circuit Cx,r can stay exactly
the same. Regarding the homomorphic evaluation, the issue that we have is the following: In order to
still be able to extract the information r of the circuit Cx,r from the prover, the computation that takes
βx and outputs γ needs to be a classical circuit. This is not necessarily the case in a quantum protocol.
For example, in the quantum zero-knowledge protocol for QMA of [BJSW16] (which is also the basis
for the quantum NIZK protocol of [CVZ19]), in order to generate γ given α, β, first a quantum Clifford
operation that is chosen with respect to β needs to be executed on α, followed by a measurement. Then,
the prover proves in ZK that the classical string obtained by the measurement satisfies some properties4.
Luckily, we identify a different quantum protocol that in fact does satisfy the property that γ can be
computed by an entirely classical circuit.
We consider the Consistency of Local Density Matrices (CLDM) problem [Liu06], which is a QMA
problem with some special properties. In [BG19] Broadbent and Grilo show that CLDM is QMA-
complete and how to construct a very simple quantum zero-knowledge protocol for it. The [BG19]
zero-knowledge protocol for CLDM is as follows: Given a quantum witness |w〉, the protocol starts with
the prover sending a quantum one-time pad encryption of |w〉 as the message α. More precisely, for a
length-l witness it samples classical random pads a, b← {0, 1}l , applies
⊗
i∈[l]
(
Xai · Zbi
)
· |w〉 ,
and then sends as α the transformed quantum state and classical commitments to the QOTP keys a, b.
For a random challenge β, the prover response γ is an opening to part of the state. We find the CLDM
problem and specifically the zero-knowledge protocol for it especially attractive for our purposes as γ is
only a function of the randomness of the prover and the challenge β, which in particular means that the
circuit Cx,r can stay classical in our setting.
Finally, by using the sigma protocol yielded by the parallel repetition of the zero-knowledge protocol
from [BG19] we obtain a clean and simple non-interactive computational zero-knowledge argument
system for the class QMA in the malicious designated-verifier model:
1. Common Random String: (crs, ek).
2. Public and Secret Verification Keys: prfk← PRF.Gen(1λ), fhek← FHE.Gen(1λ),
pvk =
(
FHE.Encfhek(prfk), PKE.Encek(prfk), πV
)
, svk =
(
prfk, fhek
)
.
For any prover that wishes to give a proof for an instance x ∈ Lyes, it executes the following:
• Proof: If πV is valid, P computes α← Ξ.P(|w〉; r) and sends
|π〉 =
(
α, FHE.Eval(Cx,r,FHE.Enc(prfk)), PKE.Encek(r), πP
)
.
4in that protocol it is also needed that the verifier itself makes the Clifford operation and measurement, which makes the
protocol more challenging to use for a NIZK protocol.
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1.3 Related Work
In this section we discuss the main challenges in the construction of non-interactive zero-knowledge
protocols for QMA (specifically in the CRS model) and the previous works on QMA NIZKs.
1.3.1 Can we Build a NIZK protocol for QMA in the CRS model?
In short, the answer to the above question is that we don’t know, and this section does not aim to answer
it. This section is intended to give some evidence to why constructing a NIZK for QMA in the CRS
model seem to require a different set of techniques from what we currently have for NP. In what follows
we will start with briefly recalling how NIZKs for NP are constructed and then understand why current
approaches fail in the setting of quantum proofs.
NP,Fiat-Shamir andCorrelation Intractability. In order to construct a non-interactive zero-knowledge
protocol for NP under standard assumptions, the construction starts with a sigma protocol (Σ.P,Σ.V).
To make the protocol non-interactive, the Fiat-Shamir transform is applied: By assuming public oracle
access to a random function F , the prover applies it to α and treat its (random-string) output F (α) as the
challenge string β. It then computes γ and sends all of this information to the verifier, who makes sure
that β was rightfully generated β = F (α), and that the sigma protocol verifier Σ.V(α, β, γ) accepts.
Since we don’t know how to construct a cryptographic primitive that acts as a publicly-computable
random function, the above protocol is secure only in the random oracle model, that is, only if we directly
assume public access to such random function F .
In order to prove the security of the NIZK protocol in the standard model (with access to a common
reference string rather than a random oracle), the final part of the construction involves swapping the
random function F with a new, special hash function H - this general technique of swapping F with
a special hash function H is usually called the Correlation Intractability (CI) paradigm [CGH04]. The
properties of the hash function H or the meaning of correlation intractability are less relevant to this
overview, but it is suffices to say that under the LWE assumption it is known how to construct a hash
functionH that can be swapped with F in the FS transform and where the protocol can be proven secure
[CCH+19, PS19].
Can we use Known Classical NIZKTechniques for QuantumProtocols? There are two known routes
for getting a quantum-secure NIZK for NP in the CRS model, the first is through the FS transform and
CI (which also uses only standard assumptions, described above) and the second is through the hidden
bits model and indistinguishability obfuscation. It is natural to ask whether we can use these techniques
for QMA (the question of whether the FS transform can be used for quantum protocols was asked as one
of the open questions in section 1.4 of [BG19]).
We first review the ability to use the FS transform (and in particular correlation intractability) for
QMA and explain why there is an issue with the no-cloning theorem. In the quantum setting, sigma
protocols (Ξ.P,Ξ.V) [BG19, BJSW16] are quite the same but with the main difference that the first
message α is quantum (and of course, the prover takes as input a quantum witness |w〉 rather than
classical). Recall that when we use the FS transform on a sigma protocol in order to generate a NIZK,
for the protocol to be complete, when the parties act honestly then the verifier needs to verify that the
random function F yields the challenge, that is F (α) = β. This means that now F needs to be a quantum
transformation such that for x ∈ Lyes and an honestly generated α← Ξ.P(|w〉), F (α) is always the same
classical string (with overwhelming probability). Now, denote by s the classical string s.t. F (α) = s, and
we have a generating circuit for the quantum witness: |w〉 = Ξ.P†(·) ·F † · |s〉, where the inverse versions
of F and Ξ.P are purified. This seems to violate the no-cloning theorem in the following manner: the
prover gets a copy of the witness and can generate a generating circuit for the witness state, this circuit
can be used to generate arbitrarily many copies of the state. Finally, because we can always consider a
trivial language with a dummy witness, and take the quantum witness to be some unclonable state (for
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example, a pseudorandom quantum state) we get a contradiction to the no-cloning theorem.
Even if we aim to construct a NIZK using the FS transform for QCMA, the subclass of QMA where
the verification algorithm is still quantum but the witness is classical, the problem is not seemed to be
solved. The reason, is that we don’t know how to construct sigma protocols for QCMA where the first
message α is classical, and the same contradiction to the no-cloning theorem holds.
The second known route of obtaining a quantum-secure NIZK protocol for NP in the CRS model
is through the hidden bits model [FLS99] which is implementable by sub-exponentially-secure indis-
tinguishability obfuscation [BPW16]. In the hidden bits model, intuitively (and roughly), the trusted
party samples as the common reference string a commitment to a string sampled from some distribution
(where by using a trapdoor permutation, the prover can open the commitments efficiently), and the prover
proves that the instance at hand x ∈ Lyes satisfies some property related to the string underlying the
commitments. Even if we are willing to assume the very strong cryptographic assumptions which are
needed for the realization of this protocol (i.e. sub-exponentially-secure post-quantum indistinguishabil-
ity obfuscation), it is currently unknown how to use the hidden bits model to instantiate non-interactive
zero-knowledge quantum protocols.
1.3.2 Relaxations of the CRS Model and Previous Work
The constructions of NIZKs for NP discussed in subsection 1.3.1 are implicitly in the CRSmodel, where
the setup consists of a string that is sampled and published by the trusted party, in particular, nor the
prover or verifier hold any trapdoors over the setup. Sometimes when it is unknown how to build a NIZK
in the CRSmodel (or unknown how to minimize the assumptions for building one) we turn to relaxations
of the CRS model. For example, in the designated-verifier model (DV-NIZK) [PV+06] the trusted party
samples, along with the CRS, a pair of public and secret verification keys (pvk, svk), publishes pvk
along with the CRS and hands svk only to the verifier. Another example is the designated prover model
(DP-NIZK) [KW19], which is analogous to the DV-NIZK model, only that the prover is the one who
gets a secret, now-proof key.
It is a well known fact in the design of NIZKs that when the verifier holds a secret verification key
(e.g. in the DV-NIZK model) then multi-theorem zero knowledge can be achieved generically by the
compiler of [FLS99], but multi-theorem soundness becomes non-trivial. For example, it is possible (and
is sometimes provably the case) that the prover can decode the verifier’s secret key by having access
multiple times to the verifier’s verdict function, consequently breaking the soundness of the protocol.
Indeed, one example is that until the works of [QRW19, LQR+19], based on [PV+06] it was only
known how to get single-theorem-secure DV-NIZK for NP, and another example is that this is the current
situation with QMA constructions of NIZK protocols.
The QMA NIZK protocol of Broadbent and Grilo [BG19] is in the secret parameters model (i.e.
the protocol is both designated-prover and designated-verifier and both parties get secret keys from the
trusted party) but is a proof system and has statistical soundness rather than the computational soundness
we achieve. The protocol of Coladangelo, Vidick and Zhang [CVZ19] is in a model that is somewhat
between the common reference string model and the DV-NIZK model, where the trusted party samples
a common reference string and the verifier itself samples a pair (pvk, svk) where pvk is a quantum state.
Both of the abovementioned protocols are not reusable.
Outside of the standard model, an additional construction by Alagic, Childs, Grilo and Hung
[ACGH19] yields a QMA NIZK protocol in the quantum random oracle model (with additional setup in
the secret parameters model) which is both reusable and classical-verifier.
There are two main issues with letting the trusted party sample secret keys for any of the parties:
First, the trust requirements of the setup now increase as the party receiving the secret key should assume
that the trusted party handles its secret information securely. The second issue is that of centralization
of computational resources: for example, in the DV-NIZK model, the trusted party is now responsible
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for sampling a fresh pair (pvk, svk) for every new verifier that wishes to use the protocol, which is very
different from the CRS setting where it samples a string and from that point on can terminate.
The malicious designated-verifier (MDV-NIZK) model [QRW19, LQR+19] seeks to solve the above
two problems, which is also the model of our protocol. In the MDV-NIZK model the trusted party only
samples a common random string, and then, any verifier wishing to use the protocol can sample by itself
a pair of classical keys (pvk, svk) and publish pvk. The protocol then stays secure even if the public key
pvk is maliciously-generated.
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2 Preliminaries
We rely on standard notions of classical Turing machines and Boolean circuits:
• A PPT algorithm is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine.
• Let M be a PPT and let x denote the random variable which is the output of M . Whenver the
entropy of the output of M is non-zero, we denote the random experiment of sampling x with
x←M(·). If the entropy of the output ofM is zero (i.e. M is deterministic), we denote x = M(·).
• We sometimes think about PPT algorithms as polynomial-size uniform families of circuits, these
are equivalent models. A polynomial-size circuit family C is a sequence of circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N,
such that each circuit Cλ is of polynomial size λ
O(1). We say that the family is uniform if there
exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm M that on input 1λ outputs Cλ.
• For a PPT algorithm M , we denote by M(x; r) the output of M on input x and random coins r.
For such an algorithm and any input x, we write m ∈ M(x) to denote the fact that m is in the
support ofM(x; ·).
We follow standard notions from quantum computation.
• A QPT algorithm is a quantum polynomial-time Turing machine.
• We sometimes think about QPT algorithms as polynomial-size uniform families of quantum
circuits, these are equivalent models. A polynomial-size quantum circuit family C is a sequence of
quantum circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N, such that each circuit Cλ is of polynomial size λ
O(1). We say that
the family is uniform if there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithmM that on input 1λ
outputs Cλ.
• An interactive algorithmM , in a two-party setting, has input divided into two registers and output
divided into two registers. For the input, one register Im is for an input message from the other
party, and a second register Ia is an auxiliary input that acts as an inner state of the party. For the
output, one register Om is for a message to be sent to the other party, and another register Oa is
again for auxiliary output that acts again as an inner state. For a quantum interactive algorithmM ,
both input and output registers are quantum.
The Adversarial Model. Throughout, efficient adversaries are modeled as quantum circuits with
non-uniform quantum advice (i.e. quantum auxiliary input). Formally, a polynomial-size adversary
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A∗ = {A∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N, consists of a polynomial-size non-uniform sequence of quantum circuits {A
∗
λ}λ∈N,
and a sequence of polynomial-size mixed quantum states {ρλ}λ∈N.
For an interactive quantum adversary in a classical protocol, it can be assumed without loss of
generality that its output message register is always measured in the computational basis at the end of
computation. This assumption is indeed without the loss of generality, because whenever a quantum state
is sent through a classical channel then qubits decohere and are effectively measured in the computational
basis.
Indistinguishability in the Quantum Setting.
• Let f : N→ [0, 1] be a function.
– f is negligible if for every constant c ∈ N there exists N ∈ N such that for all n > N ,
f(n) < n−c.
– f is noticeable if there exists c ∈ N, N ∈ N such that for every n ≥ N , f(n) ≥ n−c.
– f is overwhelming if it is of the form 1− µ(n), for a negligible function µ.
• We may consider random variables over bit strings or over quantum states. This will be clear from
the context.
• For two random variables X and Y supported on quantum states, quantum distinguisher circuit D
with, quantum auxiliary input ρ, and µ ∈ [0, 1], we write X ≈D,ρ,µ Y if
|Pr[D(X; ρ) = 1]− Pr[D(Y ; ρ) = 1]| ≤ µ.
• Two ensembles of random variables X = {Xi}λ∈N,i∈Iλ , Y = {Yi}λ∈N,i∈Iλ over the same set of
indices I = ·∪λ∈NIλ are said to be computationally indistinguishable, denoted by X ≈c Y , if for
every polynomial-size quantum distinguisher D = {Dλ, ρλ}λ∈N there exists a negligible function
µ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, i ∈ Iλ,
Xi ≈Dλ,ρλ,µ(λ) Yi .
• The trace distance between two distributions X,Y supported over quantum states, denoted
TD(X,Y ), is a generalization of statistical distance to the quantum setting and represents the
maximal distinguishing advantage between two distributions supported over quantum states, by un-
bounded quantum algorithms. We thus say that ensembles X = {Xi}λ∈N,i∈Iλ , Y = {Yi}λ∈N,i∈Iλ ,
supported over quantum states, are statistically indistinguishable (and write X ≈s Y), if there
exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N, i ∈ Iλ,
TD(Xi, Yi) ≤ µ(λ) .
In what follows, we introduce the cryptographic tools used in this work. By default, all algorithms
are classical and efficient, and security holds against polynomial-size non-uniform quantum adversaries
with quantum advice.
2.1 Cryptographic Tools
2.1.1 Interactive Proofs and Sigma Protocols
We define interactive proof systems and then proceed to describe sigma protocols, which are a special
case of interactive proof systems. In what follows, we denote by (P,V) a protocol between two parties
P and V. For common input x, we denote by OUTV〈P,V〉(x) the output of V in the protocol. For
honest verifiers, this output will be a single bit indicating acceptance or rejection of the proof. Malicious
quantum verifiers may have arbitrary quantum output.
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Definition 2.1 (Quantum Proof Systems for QMA). Let (P,V) be a quantum protocol with an honest
QPT prover P and an honest QPT verifier V for a problem L ∈ QMA, satisfying:
1. Statistical Completeness: There is a polynomial k(·) and a negligible function µ(·) s.t. for any
λ ∈ N, x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ , |w〉 ∈ RL(x)5,
Pr[OUTV〈P(|w〉
⊗k(λ)),V〉(x) = 1] ≥ 1− µ(λ) .
2. Statistical Soundness: There exists a negligible function µ(·), such that for any (unbounded)
prover P∗, any security parameter λ ∈ N, and any x ∈ {0, 1}λ \ L,
Pr [OUTV〈P
∗,V〉(x) = 1] ≤ µ(λ) .
We use the abstraction of Sigma Protocols, which are public-coin three-message proof systems with
a weak zero-knowledge quarantee. We define quantum Sigma Protocols for gap problems in QMA.
Definition 2.2 (Quantum Sigma Protocol for QMA). A quantum sigma protocol for L ∈ QMA is a
quantum proof system (Ξ.P,Ξ.V) (as in Definition 2.1) with 3 messages and the following syntax.
• α = Ξ.P(|w〉⊗k(λ); r) : Given k(λ) copies of the quantum witness w ∈ RL(x) and classical
randomness r, the first prover message consists of a quantum message α generated by a quantum
unitary computation Ξ.P.
• β ← Ξ.V(x) : The verifier simply outputs a string of poly(|x|) random bits.
• γ = Ξ.P3(β, r) : Given the verifier’s β and the randomness r, the prover outputs a response γ by
a classical computation Ξ.P3.
The protocol satisfies the following.
Special Zero-Knowledge: There exists a QPT simulator Ξ.Sim such that,
{
(α, γ) | r← Uℓ(λ), α = Ξ.P(|w〉
⊗k(λ); r), γ = Ξ.P3(β, r)
}
λ,x,|w〉,β
≈c {(α, γ) | (α, γ) ← Ξ.Sim(x, β)}λ,x,|w〉,β ,
where λ ∈ N, x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ, |w〉 ∈ RL(x), β ∈ {0, 1}
poly(λ) and ℓ(λ) is the amount of randomness
needed for the first prover message.
Instantiations. Quantum sigma protocols follow from the parallel repetition of the 3-message quantum
zero-knowledge protocols of [BG19] for QMA.
2.1.2 Leveled Fully-Homomorphic Encryption with Circuit Privacy
We define a leveled fully-homomorphic encryption scheme with circuit privacy, that is, for an encryption
ct = FHE.Enc(x) and a circuit C , a C-homomorphically-evaluated ciphertext cˆt = FHE.Eval(C, ct)
reveals nothing on C but C(x).
Definition 2.3 (Circuit-Private Fully-HomomorphicEncryption). A circuit-private, leveled fully-homomoprhic
encryption scheme (FHE.Gen, FHE.Enc, FHE.Eval, FHE.Dec) has the following syntax:
5For a problem L = (Lyes,Lno) in QMA, for an instance x ∈ Lyes, the setRL(x) is the (possily infinite) set of quantum
witnesses that make the BQP verification machine accept with some overwhelming probability 1− negl(λ).
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• sk ← FHE.Gen(1λ, 1s(λ)) : a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter 1λ and a
circuit size bound s(λ) and outputs a secret key sk.
• ct ← FHE.Encsk(x) : a probabilistic algorithm that given the secret key, takes a string x ∈ {0, 1}
∗
and outputs a ciphertext ct.
• cˆt ← FHE.Eval(C, ct) : a probabilistic algorithm that takes a (classical) circuitC and a ciphertext
ct and outputs an evaluated ciphertext cˆt.
• xˆ = FHE.Decsk(cˆt) : a deterministic algorithm that takes a ciphertext cˆt and outputs a string xˆ.
The scheme satisfies the following.
• Perfect Correctness: For any polynomial s(·), for any λ ∈ N, size-s(λ) classical circuit C and
input x for C ,
Pr

FHE.Decsk(cˆt) = C(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
sk← FHE.Gen(1λ, 1s(λ)),
ct← FHE.Encsk(x),
cˆt← FHE.Eval(C, ct)

 = 1 .
• Input Privacy: For every polynomial ℓ(·) (and any polynomial s(λ)),
{
ct
∣∣∣∣ sk← FHE.Gen(1
λ, 1s(λ)),
ct ← FHE.Encsk(x0)
}
λ,x0,x1
≈c
{
ct
∣∣∣∣ sk← FHE.Gen(1
λ, 1s(λ)),
ct← FHE.Encsk(x1)
}
λ,x0,x1
,
where λ ∈ N and x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(λ) .
• Statistical Circuit Privacy: There exist unbounded algorithms, probabilistic Sim and determin-
istic Ext such that:
– For every x ∈ {0, 1}∗, ct ∈ FHE.Enc(x), the extractor outputs Ext(ct) = x.
– For any polynomial s(·),
{FHE.Eval(C, ct∗)}λ,C,ct∗ ≈s {Sim( 1
λ, C(Ext(1λ, ct∗)) )}λ,C,ct∗ ,
where λ ∈ N, C is a s(λ)-size circuit, and ct∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗.
The next claim follows directly from the circuit privacy property, and will be used throughout the analysis.
Claim 2.1 (Evaluations of Agreeing Circuits are Statistically Close). For any polynomial s(·),
{SFE.Eval(C0, ct
∗)}λ,C0,C1,ct ≈s {SFE.Eval(C1, ct
∗)}λ,C0,C1,ct ,
where λ ∈ N, C0, C1 are two s(λ)-size functionally-equivalent circuits, and ct
∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Instantiations. Circuit-private leveled FHE schemes are known based on LWE [OPCPC14, BD18].
2.1.3 Pseudorandom-key Public-key Encryption
We define a public-key encryption scheme with pseudorandom public keys.
Definition 2.4 (Pseudorandom-key Public-key Encryption). A pseudorandom-key public-key encryption
scheme (PKE.Gen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) has the following syntax:
11
• (pk, sk) ← PKE.Gen(1λ) : a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter 1λ and
outputs a pair of public and secret keys (pk, sk).
• ct ← PKE.Encpk(x) : a probabilistic algorithm that given the public key, takes a stringx ∈ {0, 1}
∗
and outputs a ciphertext ct.
• x = FHE.Decsk(ct) : a deterministic algorithm that given the secret key, takes a ciphertext ct and
outputs a string x.
The scheme satisfies the following.
• Statistical Correctness Against Malicious Encryptors: There is a negligible function negl(·)
such that for any λ ∈ N and input x ∈ {0, 1}∗, the following perfect correctness holds with
probability at least 1− negl(λ) over sampling (pk, sk)← PKE.Gen(1λ):
Pr [PKE.Decsk(ct) = x | ct ← PKE.Encpk(x)] = 1 .
• Public-key Pseudorandomness: For λ ∈ N let ℓ(λ) be the length of the public key generated by
PKE.Gen(1λ), then,
{
pk
∣∣∣ (pk, sk)← PKE.Gen(1λ)}
λ∈N
≈c
{
Uℓ(λ)
}
λ∈N
.
• Encryption Security: For every polynomial l(·),
{
(pk, ct)
∣∣∣∣ (pk, sk)← PKE.Gen(1
λ),
ct← PKE.Encpk(x0)
}
λ,x0,x1
≈c
{
(pk, ct)
∣∣∣∣ (pk, sk)← PKE.Gen(1
λ),
ct ← PKE.Encpk(x1)
}
λ,x0,x1
,
where λ ∈ N and x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}
l(λ) .
Instantiations. Pseudorandom-key public-key encryption schemes are known based on LWE [Reg09].
2.1.4 Pseudorandom Function
Definition 2.5 (Pseudorandom Function (PRF)). A pseudorandom function scheme (PRF.Gen, PRF.F)
has the following syntax:
• sk ← PRF.Gen(1λ, 1ℓ(λ)) : a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter 1λ and an
output size ℓ(λ) and outputs a secret key sk.
• y = PRF.Fsk(x) : a deterministic algorithm that given the secret key, takes a string x ∈ {0, 1}
∗
and outputs a string y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ(λ).
The scheme satisfies the following property.
• Pseudorandomness: For every quantum polynomial-size distinguisher D = {Dλ, ρλ}λ∈N and
polynomial ℓ(·) there is a negligible function µ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
∣∣∣∣ Pr
sk←PRF.Gen(1λ,1ℓ(λ))
[Dλ(ρλ)
PRF.Fsk(·) = 1]− Pr
f←({0,1}ℓ(λ))({0,1}
∗)
[Dλ(ρλ)
f(·) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) .
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2.1.5 NIZK Argument for NP in the Common Random String Model
Wedefine non-interactive computational zero-knowledge arguments for NP in the common random string
model, with adaptive multi-theorem security.
Definition 2.6 (NICZK Argument for NP). A non-interactive computational zero-knowledge argument
system in the common random string model for a language L ∈ NP consists of 3 algorithms (NIZK.Setup
,NIZK.P ,NIZK.V) with the following syntax:
• crs ← NIZK.Setup(1λ) : A classical algorithm that on input security parameter λ simply samples
a common uniformly random string crs.
• π ← NIZK.P(crs, x, w) : A probabilistic algorithm that on input crs, an instance x ∈ L and a
witness w ∈ RL(x), outputs a proof π.
• NIZK.V(crs, x, π) ∈ {0, 1} : A deterministic algorithm that on input crs, an instance x ∈ L and a
proof π, outputs a bit.
The protocol satisfies the following properties.
• Perfect Completeness: For any λ ∈ N, x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}λ, w ∈ RL(x),
Pr
crs←NIZK.Setup(1λ),
π←NIZK.P(crs,x,w)
[
NIZK.V(crs, x, π) = 1
]
= 1 .
• Adaptive Computational Soundness: For every quantum polynomial-size prover NIZK.P∗ =
{NIZK.P∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N there is a negligible function µ(·) such that for every security parameter λ ∈ N,
Pr
crs←NIZK.Setup(1λ),
(x,π∗)←NIZK.P∗λ(ρλ,crs)
[
(x /∈ L) ∧
(
1 = NIZK.V(crs, x, π∗)
)]
≤ µ(λ) .
• Multi-Theorem Adaptive Computational Zero Knowledge: There exists a polynomial-time
simulatorNIZK.Sim such that for every quantum polynomial-size distinguisherD∗ = {D∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N
there is a negligible function µ(·) such that for every security parameter λ ∈ N,
|Pλ,Real − Pλ,Simulated| ≤ µ(λ) ,
where,
Pλ,Real := Pr
crs←NIZK.Setup(1λ)
[
D∗λ(ρλ, crs)
NIZK.P(crs,·,·) = 1
]
,
Pλ,Simulated := Pr
(c˜rs,td)←NIZK.Sim(1λ)
[
D∗λ(ρλ, c˜rs)
NIZK.Sim(td,·) = 1
]
,
where,
– In every query that D∗ makes to the oracle, it sends a pair (x,w) where x ∈ L∩{0, 1}λ and
w ∈ RL(x).
– NIZK.P(crs, ·, ·) is the prover algorithm andNIZK.Sim(·, ·) acts only on its sampled trapdoor
td and on x.
Instantiations. Non-interactive computational zero-knowledge arguments for NP in the common random
string model with both adaptive soundness and zero knowledge are known based on LWE [CCH+19,
PS19].
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2.1.6 Malicious Designated-Verifier Non-interactive Zero-knowledge for QMA
We define non-interactive zero-knowledge protocols in the malicious designated-verifier model (MDV-
NIZK) for QMA, with adaptive (and non-adaptive) multi-theorem security.
Definition 2.7 (MDV-NICZK Argument for QMA). A non-interactive computational zero-knowledge
argument system for in the malicious designated-verifier model for a gap problem (Lyes,Lno) = L ∈
QMA consists of 4 algorithms (Setup ,VSetup ,P ,V) with the following syntax:
• crs ← Setup(1λ) : A classical algorithm that on input security parameter λ simply samples a
common uniformly random string crs.
• (pvk, svk) ← VSetup(crs) : A classical algorithm that on input crs samples a pair of public and
secret verification keys.
• |π〉 ← P(crs, pvk, x, |w〉⊗k(λ)) : A quantum algorithm that on input crs, the public verification
key pvk, an instance x ∈ Lyes and polynomially-many identical copies of a witness |w〉 ∈ RL(x)
(k(·) is some polynomial), outputs a quantum state |π〉.
• V(crs, svk, x, |π〉) ∈ {0, 1} : A quantum algorithm that on input crs, secret verification key svk, an
instance x ∈ L and a quantum proof |π〉, outputs a bit.
The protocol satisfies the following properties.
• Statistical Completeness: There is a polynomial k(·) and a negligible function µ(·) s.t. for any
λ ∈ N, x ∈ Lyes ∩ {0, 1}
λ , |w〉 ∈ RL(x), crs ∈ Setup(1
λ), (pvk, svk) ∈ VSetup(crs),
Pr
|π〉←P(crs,pvk,x,|w〉⊗k(λ))
[
V(crs, svk, x, |π〉) = 1
]
≥ 1− µ(λ) .
• Multi-Theorem Adaptive Computational Soundness: For every quantum polynomial-size
prover P∗ = {P∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N there is a negligible function µ(·) such that for every security pa-
rameter λ ∈ N,
Pr
crs←Setup(1λ),
(pvk,svk)←VSetup(crs),
(x,|π∗〉)←P∗
λ
(ρλ,crs,pvk)
V(crs,svk,·,·)
[
(x ∈ Lno) ∧
(
1 = V(crs, svk, x, |π∗〉)
)]
≤ µ(λ) .
• Multi-TheoremAdaptiveComputational ZeroKnowledge: There exists a quantum polynomial-
time simulator Sim such that for every quantum polynomial-size distinguisher D∗ = {D∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N
there is a negligible function µ(·) such that for every security parameter λ ∈ N,
∣∣∣∣ Pr
crs←Setup(1λ)
[
D∗λ(ρλ, crs)
P(crs,·,·,·) = 1
]
− Pr
(c˜rs,td)←Sim(1λ)
[
D∗λ(ρλ, c˜rs)
Sim(td,·,·) = 1
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) ,
where,
– In every query that D∗ makes to the oracle, it sends a triplet (pvk∗, x, |w〉⊗k(λ)) where pvk∗
can be arbitrary, x ∈ Lyes ∩ {0, 1}
λ and |w〉 ∈ RL(x).
– P(crs, ·, ·, ·) is the prover algorithm and Sim(·, ·) acts only on its sampled trapdoor td and
on pvk∗, x.
We note that the standard (non-adaptive) soundness guarantees the following:
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Definition 2.8 (MDV-NICZKArgument for QMAwith Standard Soundness). A non-interactive compu-
tational zero-knowledge argument system in the malicious designated-verifier model for a gap problem
(Lyes,Lno) = L ∈ QMA has standard non-adaptive soundness if it satisfies the same properties de-
scribed in definition 2.7, with the only change that instead of satisfying multi-theorem adaptive soundness,
it satisfies the following guarantee:
• Multi-Theorem Computational Soundness: For every quantum polynomial-size prover P∗ =
{P∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N and {xλ}λ∈N where ∀λ ∈ N : xλ ∈ Lno, there is a negligible function µ(·) such that
for every security parameter λ ∈ N,
Pr
crs←Setup(1λ),
(pvk,svk)←VSetup(crs),
|π∗〉←P∗
λ
(ρλ,crs,pvk)
V(crs,svk,·,·)
[
1 = V(crs, svk, x, |π∗〉)
]
≤ µ(λ) .
3 Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Protocol
In this section we describe a non-interactive computational zero-knowledge argument system in the
malicious designated-verifier model for an arbitrary L ∈ QMA, according to Definition 2.7.
Ingredients and notation:
• A non-interactive zero-knowledge argument for NP (NIZK.Setup, NIZK.P, NIZK.V) in the com-
mon random string model.
• A pseudorandom function (PRF.Gen,PRF.F).
• A leveled fully-homomorphic encryption scheme (FHE.Gen, FHE.Enc, FHE.Eval, FHE.Dec)with
circuit privacy.
• A public-key encryption scheme (PKE.Gen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec)with pseudorandom public keys.
• A 3-message quantum sigma protocol (Ξ.P,Ξ.V) for QMA.
We describe the protocol in Figure 1.
The (statistical) completeness of the protocol follows readily from the perfect completeness of the
NIZK scheme, the perfect correctness of FHE and the statistical completeness of the quantum sigma
protocol (Ξ.P,Ξ.V). We next prove the soundness and zero knowledge of the protocol.
3.1 Soundness
Weprove that the protocol hasmulti-theorem computational soundness (as in Definition 2.8). By standard
generic compilation and sub-exponential hardness of LWE we extend our soundness to be adaptive (as
in Definition 2.7).
Proposition 3.1 (The Protocol has Multi-theorem Computational Soundness). For every quantum
polynomial-size prover P∗ = {P∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N there is a negligible function µ(·) such that for every se-
curity parameter λ ∈ N and x ∈ Lno ∩ {0, 1}
λ,
Pr
(crs,ek)←Setup(1λ),(
(ctV,ctrV ,πV),(prfk,fhek)
)
←VSetup(crs,ek),
|π∗〉←P∗
λ
(
ρλ,(crs,ek),(ctV,ctrV ,πV)
)V((crs,ek),(prfk,fhek),·,·)
[
1 = V((crs, ek), (prfk, fhek), x, |π∗〉)
]
≤ µ(λ) .
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Protocol 1
Common Input: An instance x ∈ Lyes ∩ {0, 1}
λ, for security parameter λ ∈ N.
P’s private input: Polynomially many identical copies of a witness for x: |w〉⊗k(λ) s.t. |w〉 ∈
RL(x).
1. Common Random String: Setup samples the common random string of the NP NIZK
argument, crs← NIZK.Setup(1λ) and an additional random string ek← Uℓ(λ) where ℓ(λ) is
the size of a public key generated by PKE.Gen(1λ). Setup publishes (crs, ek) as the common
random string.
2. Public and Secret Verification Keys: VSetup samples public and secret verification keys:
• Samples prfk← PRF.Gen(1λ), fhek← FHE.Gen(1λ) and encrypts the PRF key using
the FHE encryption, ctV ← FHE.Encfhek(prfk).
• Let rV be the randomness used for PRF.Gen,FHE.Gen,FHE.Enc. VSetup
encrypts ctrV ← PKE.Encek(rV) and computes a NIZK proof πV ←
NIZK.P(crs, (ctV, ctrV , ek)), for the NP statement declaring that the tuple (ctV, ctrV , ek)
is consistent.a
The key values are: pvk = (ctV, ctrV , πV), svk = (prfk, fhek).
3. Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Proof: Given (crs, ek) and pvk, P first checks that 1 =
NIZK.V(crs, (ctV, ctrV , ek), πV) and aborts otherwise.
• P computes the sigma protocol message α = Ξ.P(|w〉⊗k(λ); rΞ), for randomness rΞ.
• P computes cˆtP ← FHE.Eval(Cx,rΞ , ctV), where Cx,rΞ is the following circuit: Given
input prfk a PRF secret key, Cx,rΞ computes βx = PRF.Fprfk(x), and then outputs
γ = Ξ.P3(βx, rΞ).
• P encrypts ctrΞ ← PKE.Encek(rΞ) and computes a NIZK proof πP ←
NIZK.P(crs, (cˆtP, ctrΞ , ek)), for theNP statement declaring that the tuple (cˆtP, ctrΞ , ek)
is consistent.b
P sends |π〉 = (α, cˆtP, ctrΞ , πP) to V.
4. Verification: Given (crs, ek), svk and |π〉, V accepts iff all of the following holds:
• 1 = NIZK.V(crs, (cˆtP, ctrΞ , ek), πP).
• Let βx = PRF.Fprfk(x), γ = FHE.Decfhek(cˆtP), then 1 = Ξ.V(x, α, βx, γ).
aFormally, there exist r1, r2 s.t. ctV is generated by using PRF.Gen,FHE.Gen,FHE.Enc with randomness r1, and
ctrV = PKE.Encek(r1; r2).
bFormally, there exist rΞ, r1, r2 s.t. cˆtP = FHE.Eval(Cx,rΞ , ctV; r1), ctrΞ = PKE.Encek(rΞ; r2).
Figure 1: A non-interactive computational zero-knowledge argument system for L ∈ QMA in the
malicious designated-verifier model.
Proof. Let P∗ = {P∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N a polynomial-size quantum prover and let {xλ}λ∈N s.t. ∀λ ∈ N : xλ ∈
Lno∩{0, 1}
λ . We prove soundness by a hybrid argument, that is, we consider a series of computationally-
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indistinguishable hybrid processes with output over {0, 1}, starting from the output of the verifier (for the
prover’s false proof) in the real inteaction, until we get to a distribution where the output of the verifier
can be 1 with at most negligible probability. We define the following processes.
• Hyb0 : The output distribution of the verifier in the real interaction, that is, for
(crs, ek)← Setup(1λ) ,
(
(ctV, ctrV , πV), (prfk, fhek)
)
← VSetup(crs, ek) ,
|π∗〉 ← P∗λ
(
ρλ, (crs, ek), (ctV, ctrV , πV)
)V((crs,ek),(prfk,fhek),·,·)
,
the output bit V((crs, ek), (prfk, fhek), x, |π∗〉).
• Hyb1 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb0, with the exception that ek is sampled as a public
key for the PKE scheme (ek, sk) ← PKE.Gen(1λ), rather than as a random string of the same
length. To move to this hybrid we will use the fact that the public keys of the PKE scheme are
pseudorandom.
• Hyb2 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb1, with the exception that the verification algorithm
(described in step 4 of the protocol) changes. The new verifier V˜ still makes sure that πP
is a valid proof for (cˆtP, ctrΞ , ek), but the second check changes to the following: Let rΞ =
PKE.Decsk(ctrΞ), and let γ = Ξ.P3(βx, rΞ). Then V˜ accepts if 1 = Ξ.V(x, α, βx, γ). To move to
this hybrid we will use the (adaptive) soundness property of the NP NIZK proof that P∗ provides.
• Hyb3 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb2, with the exception that when generating the CRS
(crs, ek) and the public verification keypvk = (ctV, ctrV , πV), (1) theCRS for theNPNIZK is simu-
lated (crs, td)← NIZK.Sim(1λ), (2) the proofπV is simulatedπV ← NIZK.Sim(td, (ctV, ctrV , ek))
rather than generated by the NP NIZK prover. To move to this hybrid we use the zero-knowledge
property of the NP NIZK proof that V provides.
• Hyb4 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb3, with the exception that when generating pvk =
(ctV, ctrV , πV), ctrV is just an encryption of a string of zeros (of the same length) rather than the
randomness rV. To move to this hybrid we use the security of the PKE scheme.
• Hyb5 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb4, with the exception that when generating pvk =
(ctV, ctrV , πV), ctV is just an encryption of a string of zeros (of the same length) rather than the
FHE encryption of the secret PRF key prfk. To move to this hybrid we use the security of the FHE
scheme.
• Hyb6 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb5, with the exception that the modified verification
algorithm V˜ from Hyb2 is now going to be a new stateful algorithm V˜s. The new verifier V˜s
still makes sure that πP is a valid proof for (cˆtP, ctrΞ , ek), but the second check changes to the
following: It is identical to that of V˜, except that βx is now lazily sampled as a truly random string,
that is, every time P∗ sends a query for some x′, instead of computing βx′ = PRF.Fprfk(x
′), V˜s
samples βx′ a truly random string of the same length and remembers it for future queries by the
prover (for the same x′). To move to this hybrid we use the pseudorandomnes guarantee of the
PRF.
• Hyb7 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb6, with the exception that the behaviour of the
verification algorithm V˜s changes in the following way: Consider t the first time step in the
execution of P∗ (in Hyb6) such that with a noticeable probability, P
∗ sends a pair (x′, |π∗〉) such
that (1) x′ ∈ Lno and (2) the modified verification algorithm V˜s accepts - this proof can be sent
either as a query to the verification oracle, or as the final output of P∗ (in that case, t is the last
time step of P∗ and x′ = x).
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Now we define Hyb7: the verification algorithm works as in Hyb6 with the one change that if P
∗
sends a query to the verification oracle before its time step t and this query is for a no-instance
x′ ∈ Lno, then we simply return 0 to P
∗ as the verifier’s answer, without computing anything.
Note that checking whether x′ ∈ Lno takes 2
O(|x′|) time6, and thus the execution of this hybrid is
inefficient. If such time step t does not exist (i.e. in each of the prover’s time steps, the probability
for it to generate a false proof is only negligible), this process is identical to Hyb6.
We now explain why the outputs of each two consecutive hybrids are computationally indistinguish-
able7. We will then use the last hybrid process to show that soundness of the protocol follows from the
soundness of the quantum sigma protocol (Ξ.P,Ξ.V).
• Hyb0 ≈c Hyb1 : Follows readily from the pseudorandomness property of the public keys generated
by PKE.Gen(1λ).
• Hyb1 ≈c Hyb2 : Follows from the adaptive soundness of the NIZK protocol for NP, the statistical
correctness of the PKE scheme and the perfect correctness of the FHE scheme. We explain in
more detail: Assume the output bits of Hyb1 and Hyb2 are distinguishable with some noticeable
advantage, then by the perfect correctness of the FHE evaluation, it follows that with a noticeable
probability, either (1) there was an error in the decryption process of the PKE scheme at least
once, or (2) P∗ generated a false proof for the NP NIZK scheme at least once. We prove that both
happen with at most negligible probability, and thus the statistical distance between the output bits
of Hyb1 and Hyb2 is at most negligible.
The correctness guarantee of the PKE scheme is that when the public key is sampled honestly, which
is true in our case, then with overwhelming probability over the randomness of PKE.Gen(1λ), the
decryption is perfectly correct, regardless of the randomness used for the encryption (which in
our case is possibly malicious, as it is chosen by P∗). This implies that with at most negligible
probability there is an error in the decryption process PKE.Decsk(·).
If P∗ manages to give a false proof π∗P for some tuple (cˆtP, ctrΞ , ek) with a noticeable probability ε
then we can use it to break the adaptive soundness of the NP NIZK scheme: We guess the index of
the query (to the verification oracle V˜((crs, ek), (prfk, fhek), ·, ·)) where P∗ gives such false proof,
and with probability at least ε · 1
t
, where t is the (polynomial) running time of P∗, we find such
false proof. This implies that ε has to be at most negligible i.e. P∗ cannot produce a false proof
for the NP NIZK with a noticeable probability.
• Hyb2 ≈c Hyb3 : Assume toward contradiction that the output bits of Hyb2 and Hyb3 are distin-
guishable with some noticeable advantage, we use the proverP∗ in order to construct a distinguisher
D that breaks the zero-knowledge property of the NP NIZK scheme (it seems that we don’t have
to use the fact that the zero knowledge property of the NP NIZK is adaptive, but we will use
it for the convenience of the proof and because it does not cause an extra cost in computational
assumptions).
D will sample (ek, sk) ← PKE.Gen(1λ), honestly sample (ctV, ctrV) with randomness r, and
then get a common random string crs from the NIZK zero knowledge challenger. D then hands
(ctV, ctrV , ek) along with the NP witness r and gets back either a real proof or a simulated proof.
it then proceeds to run the malicious prover P∗ and at the end, by the verdict of the (modified)
verification algorithm V˜ for the prover’s proof and instance, distinguishes between whether it got
6We assume that our gap problem L ∈ QMA has exponential-time algorithms that solve it, that is, for x ∈ L we can
decide whether x ∈ Lyes or x ∈ Lno in 2
O(|x|) time. It is also enough for our proof to assume that L is solvable in general
exponential time i.e. O(2|x|
c
) time for some constant c ∈ N.
7the output bits of the hybrids are in fact statistically indistinguishable, because any two distributions over a bit are
statistically indistinguishable if they are computationally indistinguishable, but we won’t care about this in our analysis.
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a simulated proof or a real proof. This follows from the fact that whenever D gets a real proof (and
CRS) then the view of P∗ is exactly its view in Hyb2 and whenever D gets a simulated proof (and
CRS) then the view of P∗ is exactly its view in Hyb3.
• Hyb3 ≈c Hyb4 : Follows readily from the security of the PKE scheme.
• Hyb4 ≈c Hyb5 : Follows readily from the security of the FHE scheme.
• Hyb5 ≈c Hyb6 : Follows readily from the security of the PRF scheme.
• Hyb6 ≈c Hyb7 : Note that by how we defined the time step t it follows that the change of returning
0 on queries for no-instances before time step t (rather than actually evaluating the verification
algorithm V˜s) is unnoticeable to the prover P
∗.
Now, assume toward contradiction that P∗ succeeds in breaking the soundness with a noticeable
probability in the original execution of the protocol (i.e. in the process Hyb0), and by the fact Hyb0 ≈c
Hyb7 it follows that the verifier accepts the prover’s false proof with some noticeable probability in the
hybrid experiment Hyb7. By the fact that with some noticeable probability P
∗ succeeds in cheating
in Hyb7, it follows that a time step t exists where P
∗ sends a pair (x′, |π∗〉) such that x′ ∈ Lno and
V˜s accepts the proof (this follows because in the last step of P
∗’s execution it sends noticeably often a
successful false proof for x ∈ Lno).
Now we consider the execution process of Hyb7 and fix by an averaging argument the snapshot |ψ〉
of the execution in the exact moment where P∗ sends a pair (x′, |π∗〉) in its time step t, such that the
snapshot maximizes the probability that x′ ∈ Lno and V˜s accepts the proof |π
∗〉 (as a side note, this
snapshot includes (1) all of the randomness (including setup information) in the process Hyb7 until P
∗’s
step t, (2) the inner quantum state of P∗ in step t, and of course a pair (x′, |π∗〉) such that x′ ∈ Lno.). It
follows that the part α and the extracted γ (both obtained from |π∗〉, recall γ is obtained by the extracted
randomness rΞ and the random string βx′) make a quantum sigma protocol verifier Ξ.V accept the proof
for a random challenge β with a noticeable probability.
We now describe a malicious prover Ξ.P∗ that breaks the soundness of the quantum sigma protocol
(Ξ.P,Ξ.V), by using P∗ and the quantum advice |ψ〉 in order to convince Ξ.V to accept the no-instance
x′ ∈ Lno. Ξ.P
∗ uses the snapshot |ψ〉 and takes α from |π∗〉 and sends it as the first sigma protocol
message to Ξ.V. Ξ.V returns a random challenge β, and Ξ.P∗ treats this random challenge as the random
βx′ for the verification procedure V˜s. Ξ.P
∗ then derives γ from |π∗〉 (as usual in V˜s) and sends it to
Ξ.V. Recall that we know Ξ.V accepts the proof with a noticeable probability, and thus Ξ.P∗ breaks the
soundness of the quantum sigma protocol with noticeable probability, in contradiction.
We next use standard complexity leveraging to make the soundness adaptive, that is, by assuming that
the security of our cryptographic primitives is sub-exponential we prove that the prover cannot choose the
no-instance x ∈ Lno adaptively. As mentioned in the preliminaries, the security of all of our primitives
can be based on the hardness of LWE, and thus based on the sub-exponential hardness of LWE we can
get adaptive soundness.
Proposition 3.2 (The Protocol has Multi-theorem Adaptive Computational Soundness). Assume there
is a constant ε ∈ (0, 1) such that the cryptographic ingridients we use are secure against O(2λ
ε
)-time
quantum algorithms for security paramter λ. Then, by executing the protocol with security parameter
λ := |x|
2
ε rather than λ = |x|, for every quantum polynomial-size prover P∗ = {P∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N there is a
negligible function µ(·) such that for every security parameter λ ∈ N,
Pr
[
(x ∈ Lno) ∧
(
1 = V((crs, ek), (prfk, fhek), x, |π∗〉)
)]
≤ µ(λ) ,
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where the probability is above the following experiment:
(crs, ek)← Setup(1λ),
(
(ctV, ctrV , πV), (prfk, fhek)
)
← VSetup(crs, ek),
(x, |π∗〉)← P∗λ
(
ρλ, (crs, ek), (ctV, ctrV , πV)
)V((crs,ek),(prfk,fhek),·,·)
.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Proposition 3.1, with minor technical changes. Let
P∗ = {P∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N a polynomial-size quantum prover in Protocol 1 and as before, we prove soundness
by a hybrid argument by considering almost the same series of hybrids processes, and the reductions that
show the outputs of each consecutive pair of hybrids are indistinguishable, are also going to be slightly
different.
More precisely, consider the exact same hybrids Hyb0, · · · ,Hyb7 from the proof of Proposition 3.1,
with only the following differences:
• With accordance to the fact that we consider adaptive provers, in each hybrid process, the output
of the malicious prover at the end of the execution is a pair (x, |π∗〉) rather than only a proof |π∗〉.
• The output of each hybrid process is still a bit, but going to be the logical AND of (1) the verifier
accepting the prover’s proof and instance x, and (2) the instance x is indeed a no-instance x ∈ Lno
(note that in the proof for Proposition 3.1 the output bit of the hybrids only considers the verdict
of the verifier, as the no-instance x ∈ Lno is already fixed).
We will next claim that the outputs of each pair of consecutive hybrids are computationally indis-
tinguishable. For this, we will use the fact that given x ∈ L = Lyes ∪ Lno, we can decide whether
x ∈ Lno or not in 2
O(|x|) time.8 We also use the fact that our primitives are assumed to be secure
against sub-exponential time algorithms and we run the protocol with increased security parameter, more
specifically, we assume that our primitives are secure againstO(2λ
ε
)-time algorithms and we use security
paramter λ = |x|
2
ε , thus it follows that no O(2λ
ε
) = O(2|x|
2
)-time algorithm can break the security of
the primitives.
In continuance to the above, by the exact same reductions from the proof of Proposition 3.1 with a
single change, we have
Hyb0 ≈c Hyb1 ≈c Hyb2 ≈c Hyb3 ≈c Hyb4 ≈c Hyb5 ≈c Hyb6 ≈c Hyb7 .
The single change that we refer to is the check that the reduction makes when getting the final output
of the prover. In the proof of Proposition 3.1, the final output of P∗ is a false proof |π∗〉 for a specific
and pre-chosen x, while in our case (the adaptive case) it is a pair (x, |π∗〉) for an adaptively-chosen x.
Instead of checking only the verdict of V, which can be done in polynomial time, the reduction in our case
will also check that x ∈ Lno, which can be done in time 2
O(|x|). This implies that our security reductions
take 2O(|x|) time to execute, but they break primitives with security against O(2|x|
2
)-time algorithms,
which constitutes the needed contradiction. Finally, the algorithm Ξ.P∗ that uses P∗ in the process Hyb7
in order to break the soundness of the quantum sigma protocol is exactly the same as before, and our
proof is finished.
As mentioned before, by the fact that the security of the cryptographic ingridients in our protocol
can be based on the hardness of LWE and the security reductions for the primitives are polynomial-time,
we get the following corollary.
8As noted before, the proof is not sensitive to the fact that the time complexity is 2O(|x|) and not O(2|x|
c
) time for some
constant c ∈ N.
20
Corollary 3.1. Assume there is a constant ε ∈ (0, 1) such that LWE is hard for O(2n
ε
)-time quantum
algorithms (for LWE secret ofn bits). Then, for every quantum polynomial-size prover P∗ = {P∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N
there is a negligible function µ(·) such that for every security parameter λ ∈ N,
Pr
[
(x ∈ Lno) ∧
(
1 = V((crs, ek), (prfk, fhek), x, |π∗〉)
)]
≤ µ(λ) ,
where the probability is above the following experiment:
(crs, ek)← Setup(1λ),
(
(ctV, ctrV , πV), (prfk, fhek)
)
← VSetup(crs, ek),
(x, |π∗〉)← P∗λ
(
ρλ, (crs, ek), (ctV, ctrV , πV)
)V((crs,ek),(prfk,fhek),·,·)
.
3.2 Zero Knowledge
We show that the protocol is multi-theorem adaptive computational zero-knowledge9, which holds even
when the trusted setup samples only a common uniformly random string, and an adversarial polynomial-
time (quantum) verifier samples its public verification key maliciously.
We next describe the simulator and then prove that the view that it generates is indistinguishable from
the real one, against adaptive distinguishers that choose the statement to be proven only after seeing the
common random string.
Sim(1λ) :
1. CRS Simulation: Given a security parameter λ, the first simulator output is the simulation of the
CRS for the NP NIZK protocol and swapping ek with a public key for the PKE scheme, that is,
Sim samples:
(crs, td)← NIZK.Sim(1λ) , (ek, sk)← PKE.Gen(1λ) ,
outputs (crs, ek) as the simulated CRS and (td, sk) as the simulator trapdoor.
2. Proof Simulation: Given the trapdoor (td, sk), a (possibly malicious) public verification key
pvk = (ctV, ctrV , πV) and a yes-instance x ∈ Lyes, the simulator does the following:
(a) Sim checks that πV is a valid proof for the tuple (ctV, ctrV , ek) and also actually verifies some
of the statement itself: It decrypts rV = PKE.Decsk(ctrV) and checks that ctV is obtained by
running PRF.Gen, fhek ← FHE.Gen,FHE.Encfhek with randomness rV. If the check is not
accepted, Sim returns ⊥.
(b) Sim derives prfk from rV, computes βx = PRF.Fprfk(x) and then executes (α, γ) ←
Ξ.Sim(x, βx).
(c) Sim performs a circuit-private homomorphic evaluation cˆtP ← FHE.Eval(Cγ , ctV), where
Cγ is the circuit that always outputs γ.
(d) Sim encrypts ctrΞ ← PKE.Encek(0
ℓ), where ℓ is the length of the randomness for the prover
in the quantum sigma protocol.
(e) Finally, Sim simulates the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof πP, by executing πP ←
NIZK.Sim(td, (cˆtP, ctrΞ , ek)).
Sim outputs (α, cˆtP, ctrΞ , πP).
9It would have been enough to show that the protocol is single-theorem adaptive computational zero-knowledge, and then
by the single-to-multi-theorem compiler for NIZKs of [FLS99] get a MDV-NICZK argument with adaptive multi-theorem
security, but for the sake of completeness, because our construction can be shown to be multi-theorem zero-knowledge without
the FLS compilation and because it does not change the main ideas in the proof, we prove the multi-theorem case directly.
21
We now prove that the simulated proofs that the simulator generates are computationally indistin-
guishable from the real proofs that the prover generates.
Proposition 3.3 (The Protocol is Multi-theorem Adaptive Computational Zero-knowledge). For every
quantum polynomial-size distinguisher D∗ = {D∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N there is a negligible function µ(·) such that
for every security parameter λ ∈ N,
|Pλ,Real − Pλ,Simulated| ≤ µ(λ) ,
where,
Pλ,Real := Pr
(crs,ek)←Setup(1λ)
[
D∗λ(ρλ, (crs, ek))
P((crs,ek),·,·,·) = 1
]
,
Pλ,Simulated := Pr
((crs,ek),(td,sk))←Sim(1λ)
[
D∗λ(ρλ, (crs, ek))
Sim((td,sk),·,·) = 1
]
,
where in every query that D∗ makes to the oracle, it sends a triplet (pvk∗, x, |w〉⊗k(λ)) such that pvk∗
can be arbitrary, x ∈ Lyes ∩ {0, 1}
λ and |w〉 ∈ RL(x).
Proof. Let D∗ = {D∗λ, ρλ}λ∈N a polynomial-size quantum distinguisher. We prove zero knowledge by
a hybrid argument, that is, we consider a series of computationally-indistinguishable hybrid processes
with 1-bit outputs, starting from the output of D∗ when getting real proofs, until we get to the output of
D∗ when getting simulated proofs. We define the following processes.
• Hyb0 : The output of D
∗ when getting honestly-generated proofs, that is, it gets the CRS from
(crs, ek) ← Setup(1λ) and the proofs from P∗((crs, ek), ·, ·, ·), as described in the experiment of
PReal.
• Hyb1 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb0, with the exception that ek is sampled as a public
key for the PKE scheme (ek, sk) ← PKE.Gen(1λ), rather than as a random string of the same
length. To move to this hybrid we will use the fact that the public keys of the PKE scheme are
pseudorandom.
• Hyb2 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb1, with the exception that the prover adds another va-
lidity check, over the one checking the validity of the proof πV: It decrypts rV = PKE.Decsk(ctrV)
and checks that ctV is obtained by running PRF.Gen, fhek ← FHE.Gen,FHE.Encfhek with ran-
domness rV. To move to this hybrid we will use the adaptive soundness of the NP NIZK.
• Hyb3 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb2, with the exception that we simulate the NP
NIZK proofs, that is, (1) when sampling the NP NIZK common random string crs from the
total CRS (crs, ek), we sample a simulated CRS (crs, td) ← NIZK.Sim(1λ) instead of crs ←
NIZK.Setup(1λ), and (2) every time we compute an NP NIZK proof πP as part of the QMA
NIZK proof |π〉, we use the NP NIZK simulator πP ← NIZK.Sim(td, (cˆtP, ctrΞ , ek)) rather
than πP ← NIZK.P(crs, (cˆtP, ctrΞ , ek)) (where we execute NIZK.P along with a witness for the
statement). To move to this hybrid we will use the adaptive zero knowledge property of the NP
NIZK.
• Hyb4 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb3, with the exception that ctrΞ is an encryption of
zeros rather than the randomness for the circuit Cx,rΞ , which is homomorphically evaluated. To
move to this hybrid we will use the security of the PKE scheme.
• Hyb5 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb4, with the exception that when computing the
evaluated ciphertext cˆtP, instead of homomorphically evaluating the circuit Cx,rΞ , we compute
Cx,rΞ in the clear and inject the result by circuit-private evaluation. More precisely, the prover
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does the following: First, it regularly computes α = Ξ.P(|w〉⊗k(λ); rΞ), for randomness rΞ. It
derives prfk from the decrypted randomness rV, computes βx = PRF.Fprfk(x), γ = Ξ.P3(βx, rΞ),
and then cˆtP ← FHE.Eval(Cγ , ctV), where Cγ is the circuit that always outputs γ. To move to
this hybrid we will use the circuit-privacy property of the FHE’s evaluation algorithm.
• Hyb6 : This hybrid process is identical to Hyb5, with the exception that when computing (α, γ)
we use the quantum sigma protocol (special zero-knowledge) simulator, that is, the prover first
computes βx (from prfk which is derived from rV) and then computes (α, γ) ← Ξ.Sim(x, βx) and
as before, α is sent in the clear and γ is sent through homomorphically evaluating the circuit Cγ
on ctV. To move to this hybrid we will use the special zero knowledge property of the quantum
sigma protocol. Note that the actions of the prover in this hybrid process are exactly the ones of
the QMA NIZK simulator Sim and thus Hyb6 is exactly the process described in the experiment
of PSimulated.
We now claim that the outputs of each two consecutive hybrids are computationally indistinguishable,
which will finish our proof.
• Hyb0 ≈s Hyb1 : Follows readily from the pseudorandomness property of the public keys generated
by PKE.Gen(1λ).
• Hyb1 ≈s Hyb2 : Follows from the adaptive soundness of the NIZK protocol for NP and the
statistical correctness of the PKE scheme. We explain in more detail: First, note that whenever
the NP statement that D∗ proves in πV is correct and the decryption of the PKE is correct, then
the output distribution of the proof oracle is identical between the two hybrid processes, as the
additional check that is made in Hyb2 passes successfully. Also note that whenever the proof
πV is invalid, then both processes output ⊥ and are identical. It follows that the only times that
the output distributions of the proof oracles are not identical is whenever there is an error in the
decryption of the PKE, or the proof πV checks successfully but the statement is false i.e. whenever
D∗ breaks the adaptive soundness of the NP NIZK protocol. Since both of the above happen with
at most negligible probability, it follows that only with negligible probability the outputs of Hyb1
and Hyb2 can be distinguished, and the statistical closeness between them follows.
• Hyb2 ≈c Hyb3 : Follows readily from the adaptive zero-knowledge property of the NP NIZK
protocol.
• Hyb3 ≈c Hyb4 : Follows from the security of the PKE scheme. Specifically, the encrypted
randomness rΞ for every query is simply a random string (independent of all other operations in
the process) and thus all of these random strings can be chosen at the beginning of the execution
of the process, and thus we fix by an averaging argument the strings r1Ξ, · · · , r
q
Ξ that maximize the
distinguishability of D∗, where the q is the (polynomial) number of queries that D∗ makes to the
proof oracle. It then follows that if D∗ distinguishes between Hyb3 and Hyb4 then it distinguishes
between encryptions of r1Ξ, · · · , r
q
Ξ and encryptions of zeros, and since the single-message security
of public-key encryption schemes implies many-message security the indistinguishability Hyb3 ≈c
Hyb4 follow.
• Hyb4 ≈s Hyb5 : Follows by a hybrid argument, by the circuit-privacy property of the FHE
scheme and from the fact that the prover makes the additional check on the public verification key,
which checks that ctV is obtained by running PRF.Gen, fhek ← FHE.Gen,FHE.Encfhek with the
extracted randomness rV. More precisely, let q be the number of queries thatD
∗ makes to the proof
oracle, and for i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , q} we define Hybi4 as the process that performs the homomorphic
evaluation of Cx,rΞ (rather than computing it in the clear and then injecting the result, as done in
Hyb5) starting from query number i+ 1 that D
∗ makes, thus Hyb04 = Hyb4, Hyb
q
4 = Hyb5.
23
If Hyb4 and Hyb5 are distinguishable then for some i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , q − 1}, Hyb
i
4 and Hyb
i+1
4 are
distinguishable. We fix by an averaging argument a snapshot of the execution until after the point
that D∗ sends the (i + 1)-th query to the proof oracle. If the check that the prover makes in the
beginning, which includes both checking the validity of the NP proof πV and also checking the
validity of creating ctV from the extracted randomness rV, fails, then the hybrid processes are the
same as the answer of the proof oracle will be ⊥. In case the check is successful, it follows that
the outputs of the circuits Cx,rΞ and Cγ on the input prfk (which is encrypted inside ctV) are the
same, and thus it follows that the distinguisher between the hybrids Hybi4 and Hyb
i+1
4 can be used
to break the (even statistical) circuit privacy of the FHE evaluation.
• Hyb5 ≈c Hyb6 : The proof is very similar to the proof for the indistinguishability Hyb4 ≈c Hyb5,
as the indistinguishability follows by a hybrid argument and from the special zero knowledge
property of the quantum sigma protocol. More precisely, for i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , q} we define Hybi5 as
the process that uses Ξ.P (and the polynomially-many copies of the quantum witness) in order to
generate (α, γ) (rather than computing it using the simulator) starting from query number i + 1
that D∗ makes, thus Hyb05 = Hyb5, Hyb
q
5 = Hyb6.
If Hyb5 and Hyb6 are distinguishable then for some i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , q − 1}, Hyb
i
5 and Hyb
i+1
5 are
distinguishable. We fix by an averaging argument a snapshot of the execution until after the point
that D∗ sends the (i + 1)-th query to the proof oracle, this in particular fixes the yes instance
x ∈ Lyes, the quantum witness |w〉 and the pseudorandomness βx. It follows that the distinguisher
between the hybrids Hybi5 and Hyb
i+1
5 can be used to tell the difference between a tuple (α, γ) that
was generated by Ξ.P and a tuple that was generated by Ξ.Sim, in contradiction the special zero
knowledge property of the protocol (Ξ.P,Ξ.V).
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